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Recent Developments

Buchanan v. Angelone:

I

n Buchanan v. Angelone,

118 S.Ct. 757 (1998), the
United States Supreme Court
held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution are
not
violated
when
jury
instructions fail to address the
concepts of mitigating evidence
and particular statutorily defined
mitigating factors presented in
capital sentencing hearings.
Therefore, in this case the
Supreme Court maintained that
Eighth
Amendment
requirements of individualized
sentencing in capital cases are
satisfied when the jury is
allowed to consider all relevant
evidence.
Doug las
McArthur
Buchanan, Jr. ("Buchanan")
murdered
his
father,
stepmother,
and
younger
brothers on September 15,
1987. After the conviction for
murders and
the capital
subsequent death sentencing,
Buchanan sought a writ of
habeas corpus claiming that the
jury that imposed his sentence
was improperly instructed with
regard to mitigating evidence.
In the Circuit Court of
Amherst
County,
Virginia,
Buchanan was convicted by a
jury under the Virginia statute for
the "capital murder of more than
one person as part of the same
act or transaction." Buchanan
was subsequently sentenced to
death by the jury which was
imposed by the court through a
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statutorily mandated sentenCing
hearing. The conviction and
death sentence were affirmed
by the Virginia Supreme Court
on direct appeal and upon
review
for
proportionality.
Buchanan's request for federal
habeas relief was denied by the
United States District Court for
the Westem District of Virginia.
The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that by
allowing the jury to consider all
relevant mitigating evidence,
Virginia's sentenCing procedure
satisfied the Eighth Amendment
requirement of individualized
sentenCing in capital cases.
The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari
and affirmed.
Preliminarily,
the
Court
analyzed the two different
aspects
of
the
capital
sentenCing process:
the
eligibility phase
and
the
Buchanan,
selection phase.
118 U. S. at 761. The Court
defined the eligibility phase as
the phase in which "the jury
narrows the class of defendants
eligible for the death penalty."

Id. (citing Tuilaepa v. California,
512 U.S. 967,971 (1994». The
selection phase was defined as
the phase in which "the jury
determines whether to impose a
death sentence on an eligible
defendant." Id. (citing Tuilaepa,
512 U.S. at 972).
By
distinguishing between the two
phases the Court was able to
define the differing constitutional
treatment applied to each
phase. In the case at bar, the
Court found the selection phase
to be applicable because it
"emphasized the need for a
broad inquiry into all relevant
mitigating evidence to allow an
individualized determination."
Id. (citing Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at
971-73). As a result, the Court
found that the defendant
wrongly argued that discretion to
make
an
individualized
determination and have that
discretion limited and channeled
during the selection phase must
both be afforded to the jury. Id.
A more appropriate argument
would have been to assert that
only the aspect of discretion to
make
an
individualized
determination is to be afforded
during the selection phase.
The Court expressed the
concem that during the selection
phase a jury may be precluded
by restrictions on its sentenCing
determination.
Id.
Such
preclusion would not allow the
jury to give effect to mitigating
evidence. Id. Based on this
concem the Court looked to the
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applicable standard outlined in
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S.
370 (1990). Id. In Boyde, the
Court held the standard to be
"'whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury has
applied
the
challenged
instruction in a way that
prevents the consideration of
constitutionally
relevant
evidence.'" Id. (quoting Boyde,
494 U.S. at 380). The Court
further stated that its prior
"decisions
suggest
that
complete jury discretion is
constitutionally permissible." Id.
at 761-62.
By looking at "the entire
context in which the instructions
were given," the Court found
that the instructions expressly
informed reasonable jurors to
consider mitigating evidence.
Id. at 762. The Court further
reasoned that a reasonable juror
would not disregard four days of
defense
testimony
on
Buchanan's background and
character and another two days
of testimony regarding his family
background and mental and
emotional problems given the
instruction to consider "all the
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evidence." Id. After analysis of
the express language and the
context of the challenged jury
instructions, the Court found
that the jury was not precluded
from giving effect to the
mitigating evidence. Id. at 763.
In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
asserted that the majority
misapplied the standard of
"'whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury has
applied
the
challenged
instruction in a way that
prevents the consideration of
constitutionally
relevant
evidence.'"
Id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)(quoting Boyde, 494
U.S. at 380).
The dissent
looked to the natural reading of
the language in the state pattern
jury instructions and their
context. Id. at 765. It was
determined that attorneys who
do not generally represent
capital defendants and jurors
who are not attorneys will not
have the same natural reading
of the instructions. Id. As a
result, the dissenters alleged

that "taking the instructions and
the context together, the judge's
instructions
created
a
'reasonable likelihood' that the
jury 'applied the challenged
instruction in a way that
prevents the consideration of
constitutionally
relevant
evidence.'" Id. at 766 (citing
Boyde, 494 U.S.at 380).
With
its
decision
in
Buchanan v. Angelone, the
United States Supreme Court
adopted the Fourth Circuit's
Eighth
view
that
the
Amendment requirement of
individualized sentencing in
capital cases is satisfied when
the jury is allowed to consider all
relevant mitigating evidence. In
light of the finality of an imposed
death sentence, the greatest
care should be taken to ensure
that
each
defendant's
constitutional rights are strictly
enforced.
Where there is
potential for misinterpretation
resulting in a death sentence,
critical
and
the
most
conservative analysis should be
performed since the opportunity
to appeal is lost upon execution.

